On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions by de Fine Licht, Karl & Br\ufclde, Bengt
On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of
Adequacy, and New Definitions
Downloaded from: https://research.chalmers.se, 2021-08-31 16:47 UTC
Citation for the original published paper (version of record):
de Fine Licht, K., Brülde, B. (2021)
On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions
Philosophia, In Press
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00339-1
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
research.chalmers.se offers the possibility of retrieving research publications produced at Chalmers University of Technology.
It covers all kind of research output: articles, dissertations, conference papers, reports etc. since 2004.
research.chalmers.se is administrated and maintained by Chalmers Library





On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions 
of Adequacy, and New Definitions
Karl de Fine Licht1 · Bengt Brülde2
Received: 19 June 2019 / Revised: 21 January 2021 / Accepted: 24 January 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Trust is often perceived as having great value. For example, there is a strong 
belief that trust will bring different sorts of public goods and help us preserve 
common resources. A related concept which is just as important, but perhaps 
not explicitly discussed to the same extent as “trust”, is “reliance” or “con-
fidence”. To be able to rely on some agent is often seen as a prerequisite for 
being able to trust this agent. Up to now, the conceptual discussion about the 
definition of trust and reliance has been rational in the sense that most people 
involved have offered arguments for their respective views, or against compet-
ing views. While these arguments rely on some criterion or other, these criteria 
are rarely explicitly stated, and to our knowledge, no systematic account of such 
criteria has been offered. In this paper we give an account of what criteria we 
should use to assess tentative definitions of “trust” and “reliance”. We will also 
offer our own well-founded definitions of “trust” and “reliance”. Trust should 
be regarded as a kind of reliance and we defend what we call “the accountabil-
ity view” of trust, by appealing to the desiderata we identify in the first parts of 
the paper.
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Trust and reliance (confidence) is often perceived as having great value when 
invested properly.1 For example, trusting ourselves tends to make our lives bet-
ter, trusting our close friends and partners makes our relationships better, and 
trusting people in general makes it easier to fulfill our goals in life, at least when 
our trust is well-founded.2 Similarly, a population of high trusters also make our 
economies work more smoothly, generating larger profits, and it is necessary 
for solving the new and potentially devastating evils of climate change and anti-
biotic resistance.3 Reliance is often seen as a prerequisite for trust (e.g. Baier 
1986, Holton 1994, Jones 1996) and is often used by, for instance, political sci-
entists when measuring the perceived quality of government among the general 
public.4 Thus, trust and reliance are central for our lives to go well and this is 
reflected in the vast amount of research being made during the last two decades.5
However, even though these claims about trust and reliance are frequently 
made, there is a great controversy about how to define these concepts (e.g. 
Baier 1986; Hardin 2002; Nickel 2017), and there is no clearly articulated 
account of what makes such a definition a good one. For example, some peo-
ple defending a certain definition of “trust” appeal to how we use the term 
in ordinary language (e.g. Holton 1994), whereas others attacking a defini-
tion of trust appeal to its negative methodological implications, e.g., that it 
gives us a more complex theory without explaining more actions (e.g. Hardin 
2002, 2006). While these discussions have given us many great insights, no 
systematic account of criteria of adequancy has been offered, and with no such 
account we will have no clear way of deciding the validity of the definition in 
a clear and transparent way.6
2 Trustworthiness is also perceived as valuable (e.g. Hardin 2002, Colquitt et al. 2007, and Jordan et al. 
2016). For example, Jordan et al. (2016) argues that people sometimes punish each other to appear more 
trustworthy themselves, even though the act of punishing has a large cost for them personally. However, 
trust is not just based on judging someone as trustworthy (e.g. Jones 2012). For example, we might not 
trust foreign doctors as much as domestic even though we judge them just as trustworthy.
3 Trust is also by some people perceived as having final value (e.g. Pettit 1995, Lahno 2001).
4 For example, when the Swedish Society Opinion Media institute (SOM institute) asks questions related 
to trust these are most often formulated in terms of “reliance” or “confidence”. Question 8 in the ques-
tionnaire reads “How much confidence do you have in the way the following institutions and groups are 
doing their work?”, and question 11 reads “Generally speaking, how big is your confidence in Swed-
ish politicians?”. Only two questions are phrased explicitly in terms of trust (in question 27): “To what 
extent, according to you, can we trust people in general?” and “To what extent do you think people in 
your neighborhood can be trusted?” The questions can be found in Swedish here: http:// som. gu. se/ digit 
alAss ets/ 1581/ 15810 65_ riks-1- 2015. pdf).
5 For references, e.g. footnotes 1 and 2.
6 Of course, there are some exceptions. For example, Jones (2012: 62–66) argues that “trust” and “trust-
worthiness” should be defined in such a way that makes them play a certain functional role. In a similar 
way, Nickel (2017: 197–202) argues that a definition of “trust” can only be acceptable if it gives trust a 
certain explanatory role, and Hardin (2002: 1, 7f, 11, 54, 87f) agrees with Nickel. However, no complete 
list of the conditions of adequacy is offered, even if e.g. Nickel insists that there are more conditions than 
explanatory power.
1 For an empirical discussion about these issues, see e.g. Rotter 1967, Luhmann 1979, Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994, Fukuyama 1995, Hardin 2002, Uslaner 2002, Rothstein 2005, and Colquitt et al. 2007.
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The purpose of  with this paper is to give an account of what criteria we 
should use to assess tentative definitions of “trust” and “reliance” (“confi-
dence”) and then show what we belive follows in terms of definitions of these 
concepts when using this account. In order to know what we want from a defi-
nition in the first place we need to identify the possible purpose(s) of defining 
“trust” and “reliance”. There are both theoretical and practical purposes where 
the most important one is theoretical (explanatory) while the other is practi-
cal (normative). To fulfill these theoretical and practical purposes we need at 
least eight conditions of adequacy ranging from our definitions being compat-
ible with ordinary language and the values we ordinarily believe the definitions 
are imbued with, to be simple and precise enough so that we can apply these 
definitions in practice. Using these eight conditions we will argue in favor of 
a “non-restrictive” view on “reliance” and a “restrictive view” (“a moralized 
account”) on trust, where it is argued that “trust” should be perceived as a kind 
of reliance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss the purposes and 
aims of defining “trust” and “reliance” and what conditions of adequacy that 
follows from these purposes and aims. Then, we argue in favor of a non-restric-
tive view on “reliance” and in favor of a restrictive view on “trust” called the 
“accountability view”. Last, we discuss how our view could answer different 
possible objections before we conclude the paper with a few reflections on how 
our framework can be used in the future.
2  Purposes and Desiderata for a Good Definition of Trust 
and Reliance
In this section, we first identify the aims of defining “trust” and “reliance” in the first 
place. We then use these purposes to identify the conditions of adequacy that are 
most in line with these aims.
2.1  Purposes and Aims
There are both theoretical and practical purposes for wanting well-founded defi-
nitions of “trust” and “reliance”, and for distinguishing between trust and reli-
ance. In our view, the most important purpose is theoretical (explanatory), since 
the notions of trust, distrust and reliance sometimes play an important role in the 
explanations we give, both in the social sciences and in everyday life.
For example, it seems that a mature and reasonably complete explanatory 
theory about “trust” and “reliance” should aim to explain (1) cooperation, (2) 
failure in cooperation, and (3) the emergence of cooperation-enabling institu-
tions,7 since an agent’s willingness to cooperate is (in part) dependent on such 
factors. But to determine how important these factors are for cooperation; we 
7 Nickel 2017, p. 197.
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also need to be able to measure different kinds of trust and reliance. To have 
clear definitions of trust and reliance increase the explanatory power of the the-
ories which include these concepts, and makes these theories serve their pur-
poses better.8
There are also practical purposes for wanting a well-founded definition of trust. 
For example, many of us believe that (justified) trust is a good thing that ought to 
be promoted, and that this holds for interpersonal trust as well as trusting our soci-
etal institutions. However, it is easier to know what exactly we ought to promote 
if the concept has been clearly defined, i.e. a definition has at least some practical 
importance.
It seems reasonable to assume that there is a difference in value between “trust” 
and “reliance”,9 and that this gives us a prima facie reason to distinguish between 
“trust” and “mere reliance”. For example, while reliance might help us solve coor-
dination problems just as well as trust, trust might be more conducive to respect. 
So, when Coleman and Coleman argue that “trust” should be defined in terms of 
having a need for or interest in cooperation, this definition might be criticized for 
not taking into account everything we value about “trust”.10 Another reason for dis-
tinguishing between trust and reliance is that some forms of reliance seem compat-
ible with the use of force, which does not hold for trust. Moreover, a breach of trust 
might spur different reactions than a breach of reliance, e.g., blame rather than dis-
appointment, which suggests that it might also have explanatory value to separate 
the two.
But again, the main purpose for distinguishing between trust and reliance is 
probably evaluative (i.e. practical), even though we think that they are both good 
things that ought to be promoted, e.g., because they help us solve coordina-
tion problems. We seem to value rather disparate things with regard to trust and 
reliance, and that the distinction between reliance and trust proper can help us 
become more aware of these differences, as well as the more practical issue of 
when we ought to promote trust rather than reliance, and when we ought to pro-
mote other forms of reliance rather than trust. (There are also evaluative reasons 
for distinguishing between different forms of trust and reliance, e.g. between “gen-
uine trust” and “therapeutic trust”, trust that is spurred on by a hope on creating 
trustworthiness.)
How and why we value trust and reliance is also related to the theoretical 
purpose outlined above. The idea that we value trust and reliance for different 
reasons can in part explain why people react differently when trust and reli-
ance are breached, and that trustees might be subjected to pressures that would 
not otherwise be an issue. For example, physicians might subscribe antibiot-
ics more liberally when patients trust them instead of relying on them in some 
other way.
8 Of course, this is not to say that cooperation is the only context in which reliance and trust are impor-
tant, but it might be the most important contexts.
9 Pettit 1995, Lahno 2001.
10 Coleman and Coleman 1994.
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2.2  Eight Desiderata
There seems to be at least eight desiderata, or conditions of adequacy, that a good 
definition of “trust” and “reliance” should ideally satisfy.11 It is likely that some 
readers want to exclude some of these desiderata right away (e.g. the ordinary lan-
guage condition), but if this happens, it is most probably because they rely on some 
other desideratum, explicitly or implicitly. It is worth noting that all the requirements 
can perhaps not be met at the same time. It is also worth noting that desiderata 7 and 
8 are closely related to the purposes listed above, whereas conditions 1–6 are inde-
pendent of these purposes.
The Ordinary Language Condition There are two aspects of this condition. 
Firstly, it is always desirable that a term is defined in a way that is consistent with 
how these terms are ordinarily used by the relevant groups, and secondly, a defi-
nition should (ideally) explain our intuitive linguistic judgments of how the term 
is used.
The idea that a definition should be consistent with ordinary usage has many 
facets when it comes to “reliance” and “trust”. Firstly, a definition should include 
those mental states (attitudes etc.) we intuitively regard as cases of trust, and it 
should exclude related phenomena that we intuitively regard as non-trust, like cer-
tain types of reliance. Secondly, a definition should be consistent with the fact that 
attributions of trust and distrust are sometimes invoked to (partially) explain peo-
ple’s behavior, e.g. their willingness to cooperate. Thirdly, a definition of “trust” 
should be consistent with the fact that we tend to regard the category of trust as a 
sub-category of the more general category of reliance. It is also desirable, however, 
that a definition of “trust” should help us draw a line between trust and other forms 
of reliance.
The idea that a definition should explain why we think and talk about trust and 
reliance the way we do also has several facets. For example, a definition should 
(ideally) explain why almost all of us tend to agree about some cases, whereas we 
tend to disagree about other cases. A definition should also explain our comparative 
judgements about trust, e.g. that I am more trusting now than I was two years ago, or 
that one agent is more trusting than another.
It should be noted that for a definition to be in accordance with the ordinary lan-
guage condition, it must allow for the possibility of trusting institutions and people 
in general. Trust in the government and our fellow human beings is quite entrenched 
in how we talk and experience the world, and it does not just figure in our explana-
tions of why collective action problems occur and how they might be solved,12 but 
also in how we explain why certain individuals have fewer friends or do not shop 
online.13
If we denounce a notion like “generalized trust,” like some want to do, we 
can either try to show that it is not applicable to our purposes, e.g. since it lacks 
11 Cf. e.g. Brülde 1998, 2000, 2007 with regard to “health” and “mental disorder”.
12 E.g., Putnam 1993, Uslaner 2002, Rothstein 2005.
13 E.g., Putnam 1995, Lahno 2004.
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explanatory power, or that it really refers to something else, e.g., reliance.14 Unless 
this is shown, it is desirable that a definition of trust is compatible with the idea of 
generalized trust and trust in large institutions.15
A definition of trust should also be able to explain the particular reactions of 
blame when our trust is breached, as opposed to the disappointment we tend to feel 
if we relied on someone or something. This is something that is often forgotten when 
explanatory power is discussed even though it is hugely important for policymakers 
and others to know how we might react to different breaches.
The ordinary language condition is of course not the only criterion, since our eve-
ryday thinking might be conceptually confused, and to the extent that this is so, we 
need to explicate the relevant terms, i.e. provide stipulations that are in line with 
ordinary language. The reason why we need this can be explained by a second crite-
rion, namely the precision condition.
The Precision Condition A definition should (ideally) be sufficiently clear and pre-
cise so that there is, in principle, little or no doubt whether a certain thing is denoted 
by the term. The focus is normally on the conceptual boundaries of the concept (the 
categorical approach), but when the term denotes a variable that admits of different 
degrees one might also adopt a dimensional approach.
Since e.g. trust is a mental state that comes in degrees, we can use both these 
approaches. If we conceive of trust as a category, i.e. if we focus on a certain level of 
trust, a definition should draw a sharp conceptual boundary between trust and related 
phenomena, like other kinds of reliance. If we adopt a “dimensional approach” 
rather than (or in addition to) a “categorical model”, the condition requires that we 
define “trust” in such a way so that we, for every attitudinal (etc.) change, can deter-
mine whether this change constitutes an increase in trust or a reduction in trust. If 
we adopt the dimensional approach only, it is not necessary to draw a sharp concep-
tual boundary between trust and non-trust, but we might still need to draw a sharp 
line between trust and other forms of reliance.
Again, it is worth pointing out that the precision condition should always be con-
sidered in combination with the ordinary language condition, i.e. that mere preci-
sion is not necessarily a virtue (compare with the critiques against different “New 
Public Management” regimes).16 If the two conditions are jointly satisfied, we can 
talk about “descriptive adequacy”,17 “extensional adequacy”,18 or a successful expli-
cation. It is also worth noting that precision condition is strongly connected to the 
theoretical or explanatory purpose described above, e.g. the desire for a theory that 
14 There is an ongoing discussion about whether trust is a one-, two-, three- or even a five- or a six-part 
relation (e.g., Uslaner 2002, Castelfranchi and Rino 2010, Baier 2013, Faulkner 2015, Domenicucci and 
Holton 2016). Many people think that “generalized trust” should be conceived of as a “one part relation-
ship” (“A trusts”). In this study, we have chosen to focus on the three-part relations (“A trusts B to C” or 
“A relies on B to C”), mainly because these statements seem to be most in line with the theoretical and 
practical purposes of a definition.
15 For a defense of the idea that, in general, we cannot trust intuitions, see Hardin 2002. For a thorough 
critique of this view, see e.g. de Fine Licht 2017.
16 E.g. Power 1997, Bevan and Hood 2006.
17 Sumner 1996.
18 Bradley 2012, p. 394.
1 3
Philosophia 
tells us to what extent a person’s cooperative behavior can be predicted by her level 
of trust.
The Value Condition If a term we want to define denotes something that is generally 
regarded as valuable (like health or democracy), a definition should capture this fact. 
The particular attitudes that we classify as examples of rational and well-founded 
trust or reliance are typically regarded as desirable, both for the trusting agent and 
the trustee. A definition of “trust” should not just be consistent with this fact, how-
ever, but also with the fact that we sometimes regard trust as a bad thing, e.g. as 
harmful for the trusting agent, and that it is not always better to trust more, i.e. that 
there seems to be an optimal level of trust. Moreover, it is also desirable that the dif-
ferent ways in which we value trust and reliance are also reflected in our categories 
(see above). This condition is strictly speaking a part of the ordinary language con-
dition, but it is worth emphasizing because of its practical importance.
The Reliability Condition A definition should be practically applicable; it should 
make it relatively easy in practice (not just in principle) to determine whether some-
thing is denoted by the term or not. This makes it possible for different observers to 
apply the concept in the same way, e.g. to agree on what should be excluded from or 
included in the concept. The reliability condition is easier to satisfy if the concept is 
defined in observational terms, or if it can at least be easily operationalized.
When it comes to “trust” and “reliance” we want to be able to easily determine 
whether some agent trusts another agent in some respect, or whether some agent is 
more trusting than another agent. Practical applicability is obviously important for 
communication purposes, i.e. a definition that satisfies this condition can (if com-
monly accepted) improve or facilitate communication between different groups and 
individuals, both across different settings and cultures.19
The Measurability Condition Whenever a term denotes something that admits of 
degrees, a definition should ideally make it possible to make comparisons between 
different degrees, i.e. it should make the relevant levels measurable in the ordinal 
(and interpersonal) sense.20 This also holds for “trust” and “reliance”. However, in 
our view, it is not really possible to find a plausible concept of trust that allows for 
cardinal measurability, since no attitude or emotion is measurable in such a strong 
sense (at least not interpersonally). It is important to note that this condition is 
19 Of course, we could operationalize mental states and other phenomena without having a clear defi-
nition in the first place and the question then becomes if we need a definition at all. Why not just ask 
people straight-forwardly about what they trust and to what extent, without providing a definition? This 
relates to the aims of the purposes of having a definition in the first place, which was discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.
20 The well-renowned professor in political science, Uslaner 2009, argues in favor of dichotomous 
measures against 5, 7, or 11-point scales, so this is a quite common and accepted stance in that field 
even though it has become more common to measure trust on more finely grained scales. According to 
Colquitt 2007 the three most common ways of measuring trust is (1) asking people directly, (2) asking 
them indirectly about their attitude to others, and (3) asking them how they feel about taking risks, being 
vulnerable before others, and their job performance Colquitt et al. 2007, p. 910. Interestingly, these dif-
ferent ways of questioning did not vary in their results Colquitt et al. 2007: 920.
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strongly connected to the theoretical or explanatory purpose described above, e.g. 
the desire for a theory that tells us to what extent a person’s cooperative behavior 
can be predicted by her level of different forms of reliance such as trust.21
The Simplicity Conditions A definition should ideally be as simple as possible, e.g., 
to be easy to use in practice. For this to be possible, at least two things are needed. 
Firstly, to identify a conceptual core of the concept instead of merely providing a list 
of ad hoc features.22 Secondly, to use one criterion only if possible, or a conjunc-
tion of different criteria, instead of using a disjunction of different criteria. (This is a 
desire for monism or parsimony.) This condition can be used in conjunction with the 
condition of explanatory power (see below). If we do this, we get an idea that it is 
very similar to Occam’s razor, namely that if we have two definitions with the same 
explanatory power that differ in simplicity, we should, ceteris paribus, choose the 
simpler one.
These six desiderata are all conditions of adequacy in the strict sense, i.e. condi-
tions that are (in part) derived from certain purposes, but which do not themselves 
constitute such purposes. Note also that most of the desiderata above are standard 
for most purposes. The last two conditions explicitly appeal to the two purposes of a 
definition mentioned above, and they imply that a definition can be criticized for not 
fulfilling these purposes.
The Condition of Normative Adequacy This is the idea that a definition of “trust” or 
“reliance” should help us make better decisions, or create better institutions in dif-
ferent areas, e.g. by promoting trust. This condition is strongly related to the practi-
cal purpose of a definition.
The Condition of Explanatory Power A definition has (strictly speaking) no explan-
atory power in itself, but how a concept is defined can, as we have seen, affect 
the explanatory power of the theories which contain this concept. Here, the idea is 
that if we have two definitions and one “explains” more than the other, we should, 
ceteris paribus, choose the one that explains more.23 For example, if we have no 
restrictions on motive when trying to explain cooperative behaviour in terms of 
trust, it might be easier to satisfy this condition than if we have such restrictions.24 
This condition is strongly related to the theoretical or explanatory purpose of a defi-
nition. Again, this is to suggest that cooperation is a necessary condition for “trust” 
or “reliance”, or that cooperation is the only thing they need to explain. The point 
is  being instead that having a definition of “trust” and “reliance” which explains 
why people more easily can cooperate when they trust or rely on each other is to be 
preferred over defintions which cannot give such an explanation.
21 Again, it is worth noting that other actions besides cooperation can be (in part) explained in terms of 
trust and reliance.
22 This is a desire for conceptual unity; cf. Bradley 2012, p 395, in the case of “harm”.
23 Cf. Hardin 2002, 2006, Nickel 2017.
24 Nickel 2017, pp. 197—203. This is one reason why we do not discuss the ontological question regard-




This concludes our list of tentative desiderata. However, it is far from certain 
that there is one single definition that satisfies all these conditions. If some of these 
conditions happen to pull in different directions, we simply must take a stand on 
which desiderata are most important, and if possible, provide arguments for our 
choice.
Before we provide our own definitions of “trust” and “reliance”, let us first note 
that these terms have both contrary opposites – e.g. distrust – as well as contradic-
tory opposites, e.g. non-trust. Distrust is not a mere absence of trust or reliance,25 
and there is also a kind of “non-trust” where the potential trustor neither trusts nor 
distrusts the potential trustee.26 However, it is an open question whether we can talk 
about reliance, “dis-reliance”, and non-reliance in a similar way.
3  Our Own Definitions of “Reliance” and “Trust”
Reliance has been called the neutral core of trust.27 We agree with this, and in this 
section, we argue that “trust” should be regarded as a special kind of “reliance” 
(“confidence”, or “assurance”), namely a “moralized” kind of reliance.
3.1  Reliance
There is a controversy about how to define “trust”, but how “reliance” should be 
defined is not as controversial. We conceive of reliance as a three-place relation, 
where one agent (A) relies on an agent or some other object (B) to do something, 
to maintain some state, or the like (C).28 For example, I (A) rely on the govern-
ment (B) to support me if I am in need (C), I (A) rely on my rope (B) to stay safe 
(C) when I am climbing a mountain, the FBI (A) relies on the local police force 
(B) to give them all the information they need (C), or I (A) rely on people in gen-
eral (B) to do their duty (C).
One might believe that reliance on B to C consists in believing that B will actu-
ally make C happen. This is too strong, however, since B might not be in total con-
trol of C. For this reason, we believe that the core of “A relies on B to C” is that A 
judges B to make C, ceteris paribus, more probable (in many cases highly probable). 
Thus, A relies on B to C when,
27 Blackburn 1998: 32.
28 E.g. Baier 1986, Hawley 2014, Domenicucci and Holton 2016, p. 5.
25 Hawley 2014.
26 For example, according to Hawley, A trusts B to C when he relies on B to C and believes that B is 
committed to C. For us to distrust someone, Hawley says, “is to believe that she has a commitment to 
doing it, and yet not rely upon her to meet that commitment” Hawley 2014, p. 10. This suggests that 
distrust is not the mere absence of trust or reliance. Moreover, if I distrust someone whom I believe after-
wards I should have trusted, I feel remorse, apologize, and ask for forgiveness Hawley 2014, p. 3.
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(i) A judges B to increase the probability for C (the probability condition)29
According to this view on reliance, we can rely on both inanimate objects (like 
ropes) and agents, but here we are only interested in the latter. The most plausible 
(and widely held) conditions of “agential reliance” are competence, motivation, and 
opportunity. Thus, A relies on some individual or collective agent B to perform an 
act or ensure a state C, if A believes that: 
 (ii) B is able to do (achieve, ensure, etc.) C (the competence condition)
 (iii) B is motivated to do (ensure, etc.) C (the motivation condition)
 (iv) B has a reasonable opportunity to do (etc.) C (the opportunity condition).30
Conditions (ii)-(iv) are closely related to (i), and they can even be empirically 
derived from (i). Moreover, when an agent has the right competence and have the 
opportunity to C, that agent’s motivational structure is typically perceived as a sig-
nificant explanation of C.31
It is worth noting that reliance can be both voluntary and involuntary. That is, 
A can either choose to rely on B to C or “come to realize” (even against her own 
will) that B can be relied upon to C. There is some disagreement about whether 
we can choose to trust or whether we just happen to trust regardless of what we 
decide to do,32 but in the case of reliance, it seems that that A can choose to rely 
on B to C if there are no compelling reason not to do so.33
Now, when A chooses to rely on B to C it is reasonable to assume that A regards 
C as valuable, but A can also regard the very relying on B as valuable.34 For exam-
ple, I might rely on my partner to make plans for the holidays because that will 
make the holiday more successful, but I might also think that the mere relying on 
her would be good for our relationship. However, when A relies on B to C willy-
nilly, A does not necessarily attribute positive value to C. For example, we can rely 
on someone “behaving like a pig” whenever he drinks, which is of negative value. 
But in most cases, we can safely assume that when A relies on B to C, then.
 (xxii) A values C positively, and when A chooses to rely on B to C, A might also 
value the vary act of reliance (the value condition).
29 This suggests that “reliance” (“confidence”) refers to the same thing as “trust” in a non-restrictive, 
rational, or predictive sense (e.g. Luhmann 1979, Gambetta 1988, Coleman and Coleman 1994, Hardin 
2002, pp. 1—10, Levi and Stocker 2000, p. 476, Delhey and Newton 2005, p. 311, Colquitt et al. 2007).
30 Since we conceive of trust as a kind of agential reliance, these criteria are of course necessary for trust 
as well (cf. McLeod 2015).
31 Cf. e.g. Björnsson and Persson 2012, 2013, Björnsson 2011, 2014.
32 E.g. Holton 1994, Hardin 2002, Faulkner 2015.
33 It might seem counterintuitive to say that we rely on someone when the chances of them coming 
through are really slim. However, it seems to us that we can choose to rely on someone else just because 
there is no one else to rely on and the values at stake are great. For example, I might rely on a Nazi guard 
who dislikes me to smuggle me out from the camp. In this case I might deliberately focus on the success-
ful chains of events leading up to my freedom. If I am unable to do this, I start to second guess my judg-
ment of reliance. The reason for my deliberate focus on success here is, of course, that the alternative is 
to horrible to imagine.
34 Cf. Pettit 1995, and Lahno 2001, in the case of trust.
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This definition of “reliance” satisfies the ordinary language condition, and it is 
sufficiently simple and clear to satisfy the simplicity conditions as well. The pre-
cision condition and the reliability condition are satisfied to the extent that key 
notions like competence, motivation, and opportunity are precise (and can be reli-
ably applied), something that we judge to be the case. We also think (partly for this 
reason) that the definition also satisfies the criterion of explanatory power.
It is also worth noting that we often rely on agents not to interfere when we are 
trying to achieve our goals. Just think about driving a car in ordinary traffic, where 
we constantly rely on others not breaking the rules. In these cases, our reliance is 
rarely the result of a conscious choice.
Our definition of “reliance” can also easily account for cases of non-reliance, the 
contradictory opposite of reliance. According to our view, there are several possible 
reasons why A might not rely on B to C, e.g. because he thinks that B lacks the com-
petence, the motivation, or the opportunity to C. If A believes that B is motivated 
to not-C, we can talk about dis-reliance or distrust proper (the contrary opposite). 
For example, a common view among African Americans in the United States is that 
you should try to keep out of the way of government officials, such as the police, 
because they want to make your life worse and has the ability and opportunity to do 
so. This case of ill will should be distinguished from the case where the motivation 
to do good is simply lacking. The distinction between non-reliance and dis-reliance 
is quite clear in the cases where we choose to rely on agents or objects because we 
think we need to.35 If we believed that we could climb the mountain safely and with 
no problem without the rope, then we would not rely on it, but this does not mean 
that we distrust it.
3.2  Trust
How we should define “trust” is a more controversial issue than how we should 
define “reliance”. Our own “accountability view” consists of two steps. We first 
propose that trust is a special form of agential reliance, i.e. that conditions (i)-(iv) 
above are also necessary for trust. We then suggest that the difference between trust 
and other forms of reliance is that a trusting agent attributes a certain kind of moral 
motivation to the trustee, namely a perceived normative responsibility to care about 
something. Moreover, the judgement that the other perceives herself as responsible 
is often accompanied by a judgement that she is in fact responsible, which neatly 
explains why we tend to hold the trustee accountable (e.g., blame him or her) if our 
trust is breached. Thus, A trusts B to C if and only if
(1) A relies on B to C, i.e. A believes that B is likely to C because B is competent, 
motivated, has the opportunity to C, and
(2) A judges that B has a belief that B has a moral obligation to do C, or a forward-
looking normative responsibility to care for C. This is the reason why A relies 
on B to C.
35 Cf. Holton 1994, p. 67, Blackburn 1998, p. 32.
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  Normative responsibilities are here understood as requirements to care about 
the object of responsibility (in this case C), and the requirement to care gives 
rise to moral requirements to act in a way that caring would yield under normal 
circumstances.36 We tend to view the requirement to care as a moral require-
ment, but it is worth noting that there are several possible sources of normative 
responsibilities, such as capacity and retrospective causal responsibility, as well 
promises and agreements.
  Now, that A attributes a certain moral belief to B – that B perceives himself 
as normatively responsible for C – is not the same as attributing responsibility 
to B, e.g., I can regard B as responsible for C even if B herself fails to realize 
this, and I can attribute a perceived normative responsibility to B even if I do 
not regard her as responsible. But in most cases of trust, A does not just believe 
that B perceives himself as responsible for C, she also judges B to be normative 
responsible for C. This is not part of our definition, but it is still worth emphasiz-
ing that in most cases of trust, A herself tend to hold the belief that she attributes 
to B in (2). In these cases,
(3) A judges that B has a moral obligation to do C, or that B is normatively respon-
sible to care for C.
Thus, when trusting B to C, A typically attributes normative responsibility 
to B for C. This makes B a central part of the significant and straightforward 
explanation of C.37 When I trust the baby-sitter to care for my son, I do not just 
attribute a perceived responsibility to her, I also regard her as responsible for 
him in the sense that she should look out for his well-being by keeping him 
safe, fed, and happy.  In this case, her responsibility to care for my son serves 
as a straightforward, significant, and normal explanation of why he will stay 
safe.38
Moreover, when I trust the baby-sitter, I also believe that she is going to live up 
to the responsibilities I attribute to her, and I tend to blame her if she lets me down. 
That is, when B does not do C (or does not care for C), then B is prima facie blame-
worthy for not C-ing, but only if it was in B’s power to C (if the voluntariness condi-
tion of moral responsibility is satisfied) and if B knew (or should have known) that 
he was normatively responsible for C (if the epistemic condition of moral responsi-
bility is also satisfied). This explains why we tend to blame people who breach our 
trust.
36 Björnsson and Brülde 201, pp. 18–21.
37 It should be noted that this idea about explanation is compatible with many of the common views on 
reliance, such as Holton’s idea that A relies on B to C when A plans for C on the assumption that B will 
do C for the reason that B is motivated to do C, and where B does not just happen to do C (Holton 1994, 
p. 66), or Barber’s view that reliance (which Barber calls trust) is based on perceived regularities (Barber 
1983).
38 That we think B will C is an explanation of C is in line with the widely held view that A needs to be 
vulnerable towards B but also optimistic that B will C (for references, see Colquitt et al. 2007, p. 909). 
We are transferring responsibility, which makes us vulnerable, and we assume that the agent to which we 
transfer responsibility will make C happen.
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Many philosophers in the field seem to assume that the natural reaction to a 
breach of reliance is disappointment,39 whereas the natural response to a breach of 
trust is blame.40 Since we tend to blame people, ceteris paribus, when they do not do 
fulfill their responsibilities, we have a straightforward explanation of why betrayed 
trust often leads to blame. When B betrays the trust of A, B does not fulfill her nor-
mative responsibilities; and hence she deserves blame, ceteris paribus. As we will 
see, this is a major strength of our account: it can easily explain the perceived dif-
ferences between trust and other forms of reliance, regardless of whether these atti-
tudes are justified or not.
There are several reasons to prefer our account of trust to its competitors. 
Firstly, it should be preferred to the non-restrictive views on “trust”, i.e. the 
views that do not clearly distinguish trust from reliance in general (as we have 
defined it). For example, it seems that we can rely on people who we threat or 
force to do something, but to say that we trust them is in conflict with ordinary 
language. Our account can also explain why we do not trust these people. When 
we force someone to do C against their will, we do not think that they perceive 
themselves as responsible for C. This is why we do not trust them to C. Our defi-
nition does not only capture the ordinary usage of the word “trust” better than 
the non-restrictive views, it also captures how and why we regard trust as valu-
able, and that we tend to regard it as more valuable than other forms of reliance, 
at least in some contexts.
It is true that less restrictive accounts of trust will often satisfy e.g. the 
precision condition, the reliability condition and the measurability condi-
tion, to a higher degree than more restrictive accounts, such as our own.41 
However, this is not a problem for our view, since we have access to a con-
cept of reliance that shares the same features as non-restrictive trust. It is 
worth noting that politicians and social scientists are probably (and perhaps 
rightly42) more interested in reliance than trust, and our definition of reli-
ance can explain why this is, e.g., why it is primarily reliance that is needed 
to solve different kinds of coordination problems and make the market func-
tion smoothly. What we need is really a conceptual scheme where trust is 
distinguished from other forms of reliance, and where different forms of reli-
ance are given somewhat different roles. For example, it may well be the 
case that reliance has more explanatory power, whereas trust may well be 
more normatively relevant.
The most severe competitors to our account are not the non-restrictive views, 
however, but the “good will” accounts, on the one hand, and other moral obli-
gation accounts, on the other. What makes our account preferable to these two 
accounts?
Good will accounts define trust (roughly) as reliance with good will as moti-
vation: A trusts B to C if A thinks B makes C more likely, and this reliance is in 
39 Baier 1986, Holton 1994, Jones 1996, Potter 2002, Hieronymi 2008, Hawley 2014.
40 E.g., Baier 1986, pp. 234f, Jones 1996, pp. 14f, Hawley 2014, pp. 1f.
41 E.g. Hardin 2006, p. 16, Nickel 2017.
42 See Hawley 2017.
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part based on a belief that B has good will towards A, that B likes A and wishes 
B well. These views capture the trust involved in love or friendship quite well: we 
often rely on our loved ones because we believe that they have a good will toward 
us (assuming that the competence and opportunity is there). It also seems that we 
might sometimes trust strangers or institutions for similar reasons. But our view 
can also explain this. If I trust B to C because I think B loves me, then (it seems) 
I rely on B to C even if she does not feel like it, i.e., because she will then be 
motivated by a sense of responsibility. Another strength of the good will accounts 
is that they can explain why we sometimes distrust people rather than simply not 
trust them: I distrust someone if I think he has ill will towards me, at least ceteris 
paribus.
The main objection to these accounts is that they do not satisfy the ordinary 
language condition very well, since we sometimes trust people without believing 
that they have good intentions toward us.43 It seems that we can even trust some-
one who is negatively disposed towards us. I can trust the cab driver to drive me 
to the right location even though I might think that she does not like me. If this 
is possible – and not just a case of reliance based on perceived self-interest – it 
is easily explained by our view. I assume that the cab driver cares about doing a 
good job and that she perceives herself as morally responsible to take me to my 
location. Furthermore, caring about doing her job well explains in a normal way 
the actions that take me to the right place, and if she does not act in this way, 
she deserves blame because of it. This objection is closely related to the objec-
tion that we can trust people for other reasons than perceived good will,44 e.g., 
because we think they have a good work ethic and are motivated to do a good 
job. Of course, this also holds for occupations like doctors, police officers, and 
teachers.
Since our own account is a kind of moral obligation account, we need to 
ask why it should be preferred to similar accounts. According to one such 
account, A trusts B to C when (1) A judges B to be committed to C in the 
sense that B has a strong intention to C and (2) A relies on the fact that B will 
C.45 This view is similar to ours if we take the commitment (motivation) that 
A attributes to B to be of a moral nature, but our idea that A attributes per-
ceived normative responsibility to B (rather than just commitment) can better 
explain the strong connection between blame and not C-ing (see above).
The moral obligation accounts provided by Philip Nickels and Lars Herz-
berg do not suffer from this weakness. According to Nickels, A trusts B to C 
when (1) A ascribes a moral obligation for B (and no other agent) to C, and 
(2) A in the absence of exonerating circumstances is open to blame B for not 
43 E.g., Holton 1994, pp. 68f, Blackburn 1998, p. 37, Hawley 2014, p. 17.
44 Blackburn 1998, p. 37.
45 Hawley 2014, p. 10.
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C-ing,46 whereas Hertzberg argues that A trusts B to do C when A correctly 
judges B to be prima facie blameworthy for not C-ing.47
The main problem with these accounts is that they fail to attribute any moral 
motivation to B, e.g., a perceived normative responsibility to C, which also means 
that they fail to regard trust as a special kind of reliance, with a certain motiva-
tional content. Another problem is that there are cases of trust where the trusting 
agent do not attribute normative responsibility (or any other moral obligation) to 
the trustee. It is true that this is often the case, but the reason for this is that our 
attributions of responsibility (e.g., to the cab driver above) typically coincide with 
his own motivation. If the two come apart, e.g., if I regard the cab driver as norma-
tively responsible to C but do not believe that he himself shares this view, then I do 
not really trust him, even if I would most probably blame him for not fulfilling his 
responsibilities.
The account provided by Karen Jones is more plausible than the three accounts 
above. Jones suggests that A trusts B to C when (1) A takes B to care about C, (2) A 
does not try to secure that C, and (3) A has normative expectations on B to C.48 This 
definition captures the strong connection between blame and not C-ing, but as we 
have already seen, it is not always the case that A attributes a moral obligation to B, 
i.e. her third condition is too strong. Another point to consider is that Jones explic-
itly refers to A’s beliefs about B’s motivation to C, but the reference to “care” makes 
her first condition too loosely connected to the third condition. Our suggestion does 
not suffer from this weakness, since we take the trusting agent to believe that the 
trustee regards herself as responsible for C, which is closely connected to the fact 
that the trusting agent regards the trustee as responsible for C.
Another advantage of our view is that it is formulated in terms of normative 
responsibility for C, a notion that is highly context dependent,49 just like the notion 
of trust.50 For example, when we trust the cab driver we do not just trust her to 
take us from A to B, we also trust her to do this safely and with a certain degree of 
comfort, to be on time, not to be rude, and so on. The reason why we do this is that 
we are familiar with the special responsibilities that are attached to the role as taxi 
driver, and the fact that our expectations are determined by this explains why we 
tend to blame taxi drivers if they do not arrive in time.
Depending on the situation, different aspects will be more or less relevant, and 
their importance will vary in strength. Our normative responsibilities are context 
dependent in the same way, since the object of responsibility is an object of care, and 
caring can be expressed by a multitude of actions that are ordinarily explained by 
the agent caring. Our account does not just satisfy the ordinary language condition 
better than the competing views, but also, e.g., the simplicity condition – because 
46 Nickel 2007, p. 311.
47 Hertzberg 1988, pp. 319f.
48 Jones 2004, p. 6.
49 Björnsson and Brülde 2017, pp. 15–18.
50 Cf. Faulkner 2015: 424f, 428f, Domenicucci and Holton 2016, pp. 155–157.
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we regard trust as a special form of reliance and uses a rather simple criterion to 
distinguish it from other forms of reliance – and the precision condition, e.g., since 
we specify the normative expectations that Jones refer to as expectations of care.51
Our account has other attractive features, some of which are shared by other 
moral obligation accounts of trust. For example, they seem to satisfy both the condi-
tion of explanatory power and the condition of normative adequacy. As Nickel sug-
gests, these accounts have “explanatory potential insofar as the idea of ascribing and 
applying norms to others is a fundamental mechanism among humans for changing 
the balance of reasons and improving compliance with expectations in cooperative 
exchanges; and also because when these normative expectations fail, we sometimes 
take other steps to encourage better compliance in the future, such as the establish-
ment of sanctions and institutions”.52
Another attractive feature of our definition of “trust” is that it is not just com-
patible with the notion of generalized trust, but that it also gives a plausible anal-
ysis of this notion. (As we have already seen, a good definition of “trust” must 
either make sense of this notion or give a good argument for disregarding it.) 
We can think of generalized trust both as a three-place relation – with regard to 
a specific C, like paying taxes, obeying the law, or not stealing my stuff – and as 
a two-place relation (see below). In the case of two-place generalized trust, we 
think that people in general are morally decent and responsible agents who care 
about each other in the way that is morally required. In the case of three-place 
generalized trust, we think that people in general are motivated to fulfil, e.g., 
their role responsibilities, and that they have the necessary competence to do this.
Our account also allows for the possibility of trusting collective agents, like states, 
authorities, or corporations, i.e. the trustee need not be an individual. Again, this is in 
line with ordinary language. We often talk about trusting institutions (“institutional 
trust”), and our definition of “trust” can account for this. Firstly, we tend to think that 
corporations and other structured collectives have a wide range of responsibilities, and 
that they are blameworthy if they fail to live up to them.53 For example, when it came 
to the attention of the public that H&M used subcontractors that exploited its workers, 
it was blamed for not having acted in a responsible way.54 But we also tend to view 
corporations and governments as the sort of entities that can regard themselves as nor-
matively responsible, and if we believe that their perception of their responsibilities 
coincide with our own, we tend to trust them, but only on assumption that we regard 
them as competent. (That is, we can distrust a government by virtue of its motivation, 
e.g. because we think of it as corrupt, or by virtue of its incompetence.).
Lastly?, since trust is,  in our view just one form of reliance, depending on the 
content of the motivation attributed in condition (iii), we will have different forms of 
reliance. One of the basic forms of reliance is based on beliefs about other people’s 
51 Cf. Björnsson and Brülde 2017, which also contains a list of different possible sources of our norma-
tive (forward-looking) responsibilities (on pp. 22—30).
52 Nickel 2017, p. 208.
53 Cf. Björnsson and Brülde 2017, pp. 21f.
54 Not everyone agrees that such collective entities are can be regarded as proper agents, and that it is 




self-interest. For example, if A judges that B will C because B fears A or because B 
has something to gain by C-ing, then A might rely on B to C if B is competent and 
has a reasonable opportunity to C. (The definition can also be used to distinguish 
between different kinds of dis-reliance or non-reliance, e.g. I can either distrust you 
as a baby-sitter because you do not have the competence or because you do not seem 
to have the proper motivation.).
Another relevant kind of motivation is that of “good will” or “good intention”, 
which is typically included in “will-based accounts” of trust.  On these views, 
A trusts B to C when A judges B to have a good will toward A.55 For exam-
ple, according to Baier, A (genuinely) trusts B to C when A judges B to have a 
good will toward A, and accepts his own vulnerability in relation to B’s C-ing.56 
And according to Jones, A trusts B to C if A judges B to have good intentions 
toward A, and to be directly and favorably moved by knowing that A counts on 
B to C.57 Toshio Yamagishi makes a similar point when he distinguishes between 
two different kinds of “expectations of intention”, namely “assurance of security” 
– where A relies on B doing C because it is in B’s self-interest, e.g. because of 
fear – and trust, where A expects B (because of the information he has about B) 
not to act selfishly – not to deceive or exploit or take advantage of A – but to act 
e.g. ethically.58
3.3  Two‑place Trust and Three‑place Trust, Distrust and Non‑trust
There are possible objections to our view on trust and reliance. For example, it 
has been argued that trust at its core is a two-place relation whereas reliance is 
a three-place relation. This suggests that trust cannot really be regarded as a form 
of reliance.59 Now, trust can obviously be regarded both as a one-place relation or 
property (“A is trusting”), as a two-place relation (“A trusts B”), and as a three-
place relation (“A trust B to C”), but the three-place relation is probably the most 
common one.60 Some seem to believe that the two-place relation is most fundamen-
tal,61 whereas others, including ourselves, tend to regard the three-place relation as 
55 E.g. Baier 1986, p. 235, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994: Jones 1996, pp. 4, 8f, Lahno 2001.
56 Baier 1986, p. 235.
57 Jones 1996, pp. 4, 8f.
58 Alternatively, A trusts B to C because she believes that B shares her own norms or values Lahno 
2001. “Virtue-based accounts” are a subset of goodwill accounts. According to such accounts, A trusts 
B to be x sort of person with regard to y, where x is (from A’s perspective) a positive quality of charac-
ter or way of performing an action and where y is some good that A values (Potter 2002, p. 17, see also 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994 on character based trust). One problem with this view is that it is difficult 
to construct a coherent account of trustworthiness as a virtue from which A’s trust is produced e.g. Jones 
2012, pp. 82—85.
59 Domenicucci and Holton 2016, pp. 153—155.
60 E.g. Hawley 2014.
61 E.g. Uslaner 2002, pp. 22—24, Faulkner 2015, p. 424, Domenicucci and Holton 2016, pp. 150—154.
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most fundamental.62 But this is of little importance, since our view can be modified to 
account for two-place trust as well.
We suggest that two-place trust involves attributions of responsibility, just like 
three-place trust, but a different kind of responsibility, namely virtue responsibil-
ity. In the case of three-place trust – when A trusts B to C – A judges B to regard 
himself as normatively responsible for C, and this is typically accompanied by a 
belief that B is in fact morally required to care about C. In the case of two-place trust 
– when A trusts B (without any explicit or implicit reference to any C) – A judges 
B to be a responsible or good person. It is not clear exactly what this involves in a 
context of trust, however, e.g., whether A simply believes that B is morally moti-
vated, or whether A also has to believe that B is generally competent, or at least 
that he is honest about his own incompetence. This view of two-place trust seems to 
equate trust with what Toshio Yamagishi calls character-based trust, where A trusts 
B because of what he knows about B’s general character.63 However, Yamagishi also 
suggests that two-place trust can be relational, i.e., that A’s trust in B can also be 
based on information about B’s feelings and attitudes toward A. We want to allow 
for this possibility as well, for ordinary language reasons, even if it makes our own 
view somewhat less precise and more complex.
Now, our expanded view of trust – that takes both two-place and three-place trust 
into consideration – might be regarded as less unified than some of the alternatives, 
but is satisfies the ordinary language condition quite well, since the term “trust” is 
used in both ways in everyday speech. In addition to this, our expanded view is uni-
fied in one important sense, since both virtuous and loving people tend to live up to 
their normative responsibilities. This suggests that if we trust someone in the two-
place sense, i.e. if we perceive her as a responsible or caring person, we also trust 
her in the three-place sense, i.e. with regard to some particular C or other, on the 
assumption that we believe she is competent with regard to C and has the opportunity 
to C. If I perceive someone as having a virtuous character or as really caring about 
me, I do not just perceive her as normatively responsible for particular Cs, I also tend 
to believe that she regards herself as responsible, which is pretty much the same as 
trusting her in the three-place sense, with regard to some particular C (assuming that 
the competence and opportunity conditions are both satisfied.) In short, it seems that 
two-place trust is tightly connected to three-place trust (in our sense) regardless of 
whether it is “character-based” or “relational” in Yamagishi’s sense.
Distrust and its implications can also be explained by our account.64 In the case 
of two-place distrust, we think of the other as an irresponsible person, who is not 
motivated to live up to his normative responsibilities and who do not care suffi-
ciently about what they should care about. This explains why I tend to feel remorse, 
62 Baier 1986, Holton 1994, Hardin 2002. The one-place relation can also be conceived of as fundamen-
tal, in some sense. For example, me being a trusting person can, according to some, explain why I trust 
the government to do what it has told us that it will do. When three-place trust cannot be explained in 
this way, it is, according to some, strategic or contractual (Uslaner 2002, Faulkner 2015, p. 424), which 
is regarded as less valuable than trust proper.
63 Yamagishi 2011.
64 Note that trust and distrust are contradictories and not just contraries (see above, as well as Faulkner 
2015, p. 426; Hawley 2014: 3).
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apologize, or ask for forgiveness if I distrusted someone whom I later realize I 
should have trusted. Is there also such a thing as three-place distrust, and if so, how 
should it be analyzed? It is rather common that A does not trust B to C, or does not 
rely on B to C, but not necessarily because she distrusts B (even though this is one 
possible explanation). A might also fail to trust B to C, or rely on B to C, because 
she regards B as weak-willed or incompetent regarding C.
However, we suggest that these are not really cases of distrust, but of non-trust or 
non-reliance. One reason for this is that we would not blame B for not C-ing if this is 
due to weak will or incompetence, we would at most be disappointed. On this view, 
distrust is always based on beliefs about character and motivation, but this is not to say 
that there is no such thing as three-place distrust, since I can regard someone as respon-
sible in one area (like work) without regarding him as responsible in another area (like 
close personal relationships). If we regard someone as well-meaning but incompetent, it 
is a case of non-trust or non-reliance rather than a case of distrust. However, we tend to 
blame incompetent people if they make us believe they have the required competence, 
but in this kind of case, we do not distrust the person because she lacks the ability to C, 
but because it is irresponsible to pretend to have an ability she does not have.
4  Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that there are eight conditions of adequacy that a defi-
nition of “trust” and “reliance” should ideally satisfy, and that can be used to assess 
competing definitions. These conditions are in part derived from the most impor-
tant practical and theoretical purposes of a definition. We have also proposed our 
own definitions and argued that these definitions satisfy the relevant conditions of 
adequacy to a higher degree than the alternative definitions.
In our view, trust is a form of reliance, which can be regarded as the “neutral core 
of trust”. We (roughly) suggest that we rely on someone to do or ensure something 
when we judge them to have the relevant competence, motivation, and opportunity. 
According to our account of three-place trust, which we have dubbed the Account-
ability view, we trust someone to do or ensure something when we also judge that 
they perceive themselves as having a forward-looking normative responsibility to 
care for whatever it is we trust them to care about. In most cases, we also think that 
they are in fact normatively responsible for the object of trust, and we tend to blame 
them if they do not fulfill their responsibilities.
Two-place trust can take two different forms: we either trust other people because 
we regard them as virtuous or responsible persons (character-based trust) or because we 
think they care for us (relational trust). In both cases, two-place trust can neatly explain 
three-place trust as we have defined it (given that the competence and opportunity are 
both in place). We have also suggested that the most interesting opposite of trust is dis-
trust (in both the two-place and three-place cases), whereas the most interesting opposite 
of reliance is non-reliance. We have not yet investigated when our trust or reliance is 
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